TIME: Almanac 1990/1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso/time/010289/01028900.044

Text File | 1990-09-22 | 7.9 KB | 142 lines

WORLD, Page 81    MIDDLE EAST


    Barely visible behind a lectern in Tel Aviv's Yad Eliyahu
basketball arena, the diminutive Yitzhak Shamir struggled to make
his voice heard. His Likud bloc must agree to share power with
Labor, he pleaded, "to be united against the danger of a
Palestinian state." But even that potent argument elicited little
but jeers from hundreds of angry members of the right-wing Likud
bloc's central committee. Cheers rang out only when Ariel Sharon,
the big and assertive leader of the party's hard-liners, called for
a narrow coalition without left-leaning Labor. "People in Labor say
we must talk to the P.L.O.," he shouted. "That is not our stance."
The raucous crowd screamed back its approval.

    But shortly after 3 a.m. last Wednesday, party members
grudgingly capitulated to Shamir's proposal to form another
national-unity government with the Labor Party. Shamir had vowed
to give up his mandate to form a government if he lost. Later the
same day, Labor's central committee, also divided over the wisdom
of the party's casting its lot with Likud, ratified the coalition
proposal. Seven weeks of wrangling followed inconclusive elections
on Nov. 1, but the U.S. decision to open a dialogue with the
Palestine Liberation Organization precipitated Israel's warring
leaders into a second consecutive government of opposing
ideologies. The two parties converged on one overriding
fundamental: no dealing with the P.L.O.

    The new government may be called national unity, but it will
lean distinctly to the right. Both parties agreed to strict limits
on the steps Israel would take toward peace. In a nine-page
coalition contract, Likud and Labor flatly rejected recent
proposals in P.L.O. chairman Yasser Arafat's peace campaign, saying
the Israeli government "will not negotiate with the P.L.O."
Instead, the pact reiterated Likud's long-standing call for direct
talks with Israel's Arab neighbors, such as Jordan, and adopted
Labor's offer to include non-P.L.O. Palestinians who live in the
occupied territories. "We must do everything to say to America, to
the Soviet Union, to Europe, to the Arabs, that in this difficult
hour the people of Israel are united and forming one government,"
declared the new Prime Minister.

    Shamir is the clear winner in Israel's battle to control a new
and more complicated diplomatic environment. To cement his
authority, Shamir refused to repeat the 1984 unity agreement under
which each party in turn held the Prime Minister's chair.
Reinforcing the government's shift to the right is the appointment
of Likud's Moshe Arens, the hawkish former Ambassador to
Washington, to replace Labor leader Shimon Peres as Foreign
Minister in Shamir's 26-member Cabinet. Peres, under strong
pressure from his party to ensure a government bailout of the
troubled Histadrut labor federation and the kibbutz movement, the
twin pillars of Labor support, opted instead for the finance
portfolio. Peres insists he will continue to speak out on foreign
policy issues as leader of the Labor Party. But it will be Shamir
and Arens who finally give Israel one official voice on diplomatic
matters.

    That means the U.S. is likely to hear nothing other than
Shamir's intransigent line. The Prime Minister fervently believes
a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be just
the first victory in a P.L.O. war to devour all of Israel. Thus he
has found reasons to resist virtually all plans for peace talks,
since they inevitably call for a trade of Israeli-occupied land for
peace. Shamir's prime objective is to prevent the Palestinian
initiative from advancing further and keep the door closed to the
risk of negotiations.

    Yet Israeli leaders are acutely aware the P.L.O. is winning
the propaganda war. Said Foreign Ministry spokesman Alon Liel:
"Israel has to come up with ideas in order to reverse the
momentum." To that end, Israel is not likely to crack down harder
on the Palestinian uprising in the territories as long as the level
of violence rises no higher. Already under pressure from Western
allies, Israel does not want to infuriate them further with
draconian measures. That may be one reason Shamir has kept Labor's
Yitzhak Rabin as Defense Minister, thwarting Sharon's intense
campaign for the post. The ambitious Sharon, Shamir's archrival for
control of Likud, has long boasted privately that he could end the
intifadeh in a week.

    Also losing out were the four religious parties, which won 18
Knesset seats. Shamir's initial plan of forming a government with
them rather than Labor disintegrated amid the new diplomatic
pressures and strong opposition from American Jews to the four
parties' demands for stricter religious observance.

    In Washington, U.S. officials expressed relief that the Labor
Party may continue to exert a moderating influence in the Israeli
government. They feel that despite Israel's clear rejection of
Arafat's initiative, peace negotiations may eventually begin if the
P.L.O. can back up its talk of compromise with deeds. The U.S.
plan, subject to adjustment after George Bush becomes President on
Jan. 20, calls first for collecting proof that Arafat is keeping
his pledge to halt P.L.O. terrorism. The U.S. hopes that after
about six months this period of restraint will convince the
Israelis that Arafat is sincere in recognizing Israel's right to
exist and that he can be bargained with. At that point, the U.S.
Administration will have to find enough political will and
diplomatic muscle to persuade a reluctant Israel to enter into
negotiations. For 40 years Israel has preferred to say no to the
U.S. as little as possible. But the two allies could face an
unprecedented showdown unless the Bush team can figure out how to
lure Israel into negotiations without a major rupture.

    The U.S. is also urging Israel, so far without any success, to
ease its iron-fist handling of the year-old intifadeh and grant
limited autonomy to the 1.7 million Palestinians living under
occupation. "They need to do things to make the Palestinians feel
more human, more in control of their lives," says a U.S. official.
Meanwhile, the uprising has reached a stalemate: the intifadeh
can't defeat Israel's occupation, but Israel can't stop the
rebellion.

    The P.L.O. chairman does not have a notably easier agenda. As
Arafat met with a host of world leaders, including Pope John Paul
II, his aides said he was concerned that terrorism could doom his
peace efforts, particularly if that initiative failed to produce
results. In Damascus, Arafat's actions were condemned by two
Syrian-backed Palestinian renegade leaders, Ahmed Jabril and
Colonel Said Musa. Both have been accused by the U.S. of
masterminding terrorist attacks.

    Arafat has set an ambitious target: an independent Palestinian
state by 1991. To speed diplomacy along, he plans to have P.L.O.
officials unveil new proposals when they hold their second meeting
with Robert Pelletreau, the U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia. One is an
international conference on terrorism that would enable Arafat to
dramatize his promises. Another overture, an acutely sensitive one,
might be an offer to help prevent terrorist acts by exchanging
intelligence information with the U.S. Meanwhile, Arafat wants to
reach early agreement with King Hussein on the outline of a
U.S.-backed Palestinian-Jordanian confederation.

    But given Israel's position, Arafat is not likely to need such
a detailed blueprint anytime soon. Few in Israel are ready -- yet
-- to accept the seismic shift in attitude that has occurred,
especially in the U.S. Government. The Bush Administration will be
looking for a new mood in Jerusalem as well as a new government.
But Shamir is unlikely to soften: Israel now appears to have a
government that prefers territory to peace. And the overwhelming
majority of his countrymen back Shamir in saying no to the P.L.O.